We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted by ( , ) and ( , ) for players A and B.
Introduction
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted by ( , ) and ( , ) for players A and B.
We will show that the following four patterns of competition are equivalent, that is, they yield the same outcome.
1. Player A and B choose and (competition by ( , )).
Player A and B choose and (competition by ( , )).
3. Player A and B choose and (competition by ( , )).
Relative profit maximization in duopoly with differentiated goods is an example of zerosum game with two alternative strategic variables 1 . Each firm chooses its output or price. The results of this paper imply that when firms in duopoly maximize their relative profits, Cournot and Bertrand equilibria are equivalent, and price-setting behavior and output-setting behavior are equivalent 2 . The key to our results is Lemma 4 in Section 6. This lemma implies that the maximin strategies in four patterns of competition are equivalent, and the minimax strategies in four patterns of competition are equivalent.
The model
Consider a two-person zero-sum game as follows. There are two players, A and B. They have two sets of alternative strategic variables, ( , ) ∈ × and ( , ) ∈ × . , , and are compact sets in metric spaces. The relations of them are represented by = ( , ), and = ( , ).
( , ) is a continuous invertible function, and so it is a one-to-one and onto function. We denote = ( , ), and = ( , ).
( , ) is also a continuous invertible function. The payoff function of Player A is ( , ) and the payoff function of Player B is ( , ). Since the game is zero-sum, we have ( , ) = − ( , ). is upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on for each ∈ (or each ∈ ), upper semi-continuous and quasi-concave on for each ∈ (or each ∈ ), 1 A game of relative profit maximization in duopoly is a zero-sum game because the sum of the relative profits of firms is zero.
2
About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014a) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014b) , Tanaka (2013a) , Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997) .
and lower semi-continuous and quasi-convex on for each ∈ (or each ∈ ), lower semi-continuous and quasi-convex on for each ∈ (or each ∈ ). We note that any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given , any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given , any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given , and any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given ) is a Nash equilibrium of competition by ( , ) game. On the other hand, by the Sion's minimax theorem (Sion (1958) , Komiya (1988) , Kindler (2005) ) we have
We can show the following lemma. Lemma 1. The following three statements are equivalent.
1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in competition by ( , ) game.
The following relation holds.
≡ max min ( , ) ≡ min max ( , ) = .
3. There exists a real number v , ∈ and ∈ such that ( , ) ≥ v for any ∈ , and ( , ) ≤ v for any ∈ .
(1)
Proof.
(1 → 2) Let * and * be the equilibrium strategies. Then,
On the other hand, min ( , ) ≤ ( , ), then max min ( , ) ≤ max ( , ), and so max min ( , ) ≤ min max ( , ). Thus, ≤ , and we have = .
(2 → 3) Let = arg max min ( , ) (the maximin strategy), = arg min max ( , ) (the minimax strategy), and let v = = . Then, we have
Putting = and = , we see v = ( , ) and ( , ) is an equilibrium.
We have ( 
Competition by ( , )
Next consider competition by ( , ). Substituting and into and yields
Let̃and̃be the values of and which, respectively, maximizes ( ( , ), ( , )) giveñand maximizes ( ( , ), ( , )) giveñ. Then, Similarly to Lemma 1 we can show.
Lemma 2. The following three statements are equivalent.
The following relation holds.
≡ max min ( ( , ), ( , )) = min max ( ( , ), ( , )) ≡ .
There exists a real number v , ∈
and ∈ such that ( ( , ), ( , )) ≥ v for any ∈ , and ( ( , ), ( , )) ≤ v for any ∈ .
We have ( , ) = (̃,̃). Denote the value of which is derived from = (̃,̃) bỹ , and denote the value of which is derived from = (̃,̃) bỹ.
Competition by ( , )
Next consider competition by ( , ). we have
= ( , ( , )), = ( ( , ), ).
The payoffs of Player A and B are written as
Let̄and̄be the values of and which, respectively, maximizes given̄and maximizes given̄. Then, Thus, we obtain ( (̄, ), )) ≥ ( (̄, ),̄)) ≥ ( ( , ),̄)) for all ≠̄, and all ≠̄. This is equivalent to
Similarly to Lemma 1 we can show.
Lemma 3. The following three statements are equivalent.
The following relation holds.
≡ max min ( ( , ), ) = min max ( ( , ), ) ≡ .
There exists a real number v , ∈
and ∈ such that ( ( , ), ) ≥ v for any ∈ , and ( ( , ), ) ≤ v for any ∈ .
We have ( , ) = (̄,̄). Denote the value of which is derived from = (̄, ( ,̄)) bȳ, and denote the value of which is derived from = ( (̄, )̄), bȳ. Then,ā nd̄are written as̄= (̄,̄), and̄= (̄,̄).
Equivalence of four patterns of competition
In this section we show the equivalence of four patterns of competition. First we show the following lemma which is key to our results.
Lemma 4.
The following relations hold.
1. max min ( ( , ), ) = max min ( , ).
min max
( ( , ), ) = min max ( ( , ), ( , )).
Proof.
1. min ( ( , ), ) is the minimum of with respect to given . Let ( ) = arg min ( ( , ), ), and fix the value of at ( , ( , ( ))). Then, we have min ( ( , ( , ( )) ), ) ≤ ( ( , ( , ( )) ), ( )) = min ( ( , ), ), where min ( ( , ( , ( ))), ) is the minimum of with respect to given the value of at ( , ( , ( )) ). This holds for any . Thus,
Any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given as = ( , ( , ( ))). Therefore, this can be rewritten as max min ( , ) ≤ max min ( ( , ), ).
On the other hand, min ( , ) is the minimum of with respect to given . Let ( ) = arg min ( , ), and fix the value of at ( , ( )). Then, we have min ( ( ( , ( )), ( , ( ))), ) ≤ ( ( ( , ( )), ( , ( ))), ( )) = ( , ( )) = min ( , ), where min ( ( ( , ( )), ( , ( ))), ) is the minimum of with respect to given the value of at ( , ( )). This holds for any . Thus,
Any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given as = ( , ( )). Therefore, this can be rewritten as max min ( ( , ), ) ≤ max min ( , ).
Combining (2) and (3), we get max min ( , ) = max min ( ( , ), ).
max
( ( , ), ) is the maximum of with respect to given . Let ( ) = arg max ( ( , ), ), and fix the value of at ( ( ( ), ), ). Then, we have max ( ( , ( ( ( ), ), ) ), ) = max ( ( , ( ( ( ), ), ) ), ( , ( ( ( ), ), ) )) ( ( ( ), ), ) ), ) = max ( ( , ), ), where max ( ( , ( ( ( ), ), ) ), ) is the maximum of with respect to given the value of at ( ( ( ), ), ) ). This holds for any . Thus,
Any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given as = ( ( ( ), ), ). Therefore, this can be rewritten as min max ( ( , ), ( , )) ≥ min max ( ( , ), ).
On the other hand, max ( ( , ), ( , )) is the maximum of with respect to given . Let ( ) = arg max ( ( , ), ( , )), and fix the value of at ( ( ), ). Then, we have max ( ( , ), ( ( ), )) ≥ ( ( ( ), ), ( ( ), )) = max ( ( , ), ( , )), where max ( ( , ), ( ( ), )) is the maximum of with respect to given the value of at ( ( ), ). This holds for any . Thus, min ( ( ), ) max ( ( , ), ( ( ), )) ≥ min max ( ( , ), ( , )).
Any value of can be realized by appropriately choosing given as = ( ( ), ). Therefore, this can be rewritten as min max ( ( , ), ) ≥ min max ( ( , ), ( , )).
Combining (4) and (5), we get min max ( ( , ), ( , )) = min max ( ( , ), ).
Now we show the following propositions.
Concluding Remark
We have shown that in a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of alternative strategic variables, any pattern of competition is equivalent, and any selection of strategic variables is equivalent. We want to extend the results of this paper to a symmetric -person zero-sum game 4 .
